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Gerontocracy in Motion? – European Cross-Country Evidence
on the Labor Market Consequences of Population Ageing
Abstract
Taking a European cross-country perspective, this paper addresses the most
importantissuesinthenexusofpopulationageingandlabormarkets.Westart
from a descriptive overview of the demographic change currently shaping
Europeansocieties.Thesubsequentsectionintensivelydiscussesthepotential
consequencesofthesedemographicprocessesforandinterdependencieswith
the labor market situation in Europe.We place particular emphasis on the is-
sue of non-competitive wage setting.In our empirical application we demon-
strate that moderately large birth cohorts seem to experience lower employ-
mentrates,butalsothateducationinvestmentsmightbeabletomitigatethese
consequences, and that the relative economic success of large cohorts might
even be disproportionately positive. Finally, in the concluding section we re-
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European economic and political integration and an intense immigration ex-
perience have been important factors in the development of European societ-
ies in the second half of the past century.Undoubtedly,though,the most dra-
matic influence on European demographics has been exerted by post-war
baby booms and the subsequent baby busts,leading to massive changes in the
population age structure of all European countries.Yet,while the baby boom
cohortshavemovedthroughtheagepyramidlikeatidalwave,decliningfertil-
ity has caused a stable trend,population ageing.
Throughout the last decades, and recently at an accelerating pace, this phe-
nomenonhastransformedthecompositionallEuropeansocietiestoaconsid-
erable extent. Without exception the demographic change associated with
population ageing induces long-term societal challenges for all European
countries, albeit with some heterogeneity regarding their precise timing. In
this context, Germany provides a particularly interesting case study. Accord-
ing to World Bank projections (Bos et al. 1994) Germany will soon have the
highest share of older people in all industrialized countries.The proportion of
elderly (i.e.beyond age 65) relative to the labor force is projected to rise from
21%in1995to36%in2035,duetoapronounceddeclineinfertilityratesand
a simultaneous rise in life expectancy. Other European countries following
suit are Greece,Italy,and Spain.
Most directly this demographic change will have an impact on national pen-
sionsystemsandtheirfinancing.Withdefinedbenefitsandarisingold-agede-
pendency ratio, the prevailing pay-as-you-go systems of social security have
necessarilycomeunderpressure.Everrisingcontributionratesandincreasing
uncertainty regarding the overall sustainability of the system into the future
have already eroded the previous consensus about the modern welfare state.
Furthermore,it is clear that the whole spectrum of social security systems,not
only old-age security,but also,especially the public health care system will be
affected directly by these developments. Typically, medical expenditures rise
drastically in old age,and an increasing proportion of elderly will tend to gen-
erate a more than disproportionate cost push to health care. Barring funda-
mental reform, most European countries finance the bulk of these expendi-
tures through worker’s wage-related contributions,which will have to rise ac-
cordingly.
However, the discussion frequently overlooks a series of similarly important
consequences of population ageing.After all,an ageing society tends to imply
adeclineintherelativelaborsupplyofyoungerascomparedtoolderworkers,
not only a simple reduction of overall labor supply and an increasing old-age
dependency ratio. Thus, the age structure of the work force is going to be al-
tered as well.Moreover,since neither school leaving age nor the age of retire-
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the labor force in a much more intricate way than is often recognized.In con-
trast to the US,in Europe these issues have to be discussed within the frame-
work of imperfectly competitive labor markets, shifting the attention from
wagestoemploymentandunemploymentrates.Inessence,therelativeshiftin
labor supply associated with an ageing work force might impinge upon a vari-
ety of different aspects pertaining to individual and societal welfare, among
which particularly the labor market outcomes are of interest.
Taking a cross-country perspective, this paper addresses the most important
issues in the nexus of European population ageing and Europe’s labor mar-
kets.To this end,in the second section we provide some key characteristics of
the demographic change which currently affects virtually all European coun-
tries.The subsequent section intensively discusses the potential consequences
ofthesedemographicprocessesforandtheirinterdependencieswiththelabor
market situation in Europe. We place particular emphasis on the issue of
non-competitive wage setting. Furthermore, to investigate the issue more
deeply,in section 4 we provide some own empirical evidence on the relation-
ship between changes in the population age structure and individual employ-
ment probabilities.Finally,in the concluding section we review possible policy
options for coping with the consequences of population ageing.
2. Demographic Processes and Population Ageing
Thissectiondocumentshowsimilardemographictrendsshapethepopulation
age structure of all European countries. Table 1 clearly demonstrates that
most of the EU-15 countries experienced a remarkable decline in birth rates
duringthe1970s.TheMediterraneancountriesGreeceandSpainandalsoIre-
land were affected by declining birth rates somewhat later, in the 1980s,
whereas the birth rates of Portugal decreased considerably during both the
1970s and the 1980s.The Nordic countries Finland and Sweden (also Norway
which is not included in this analysis) experienced this decline rather late in
the 1990s.
The most pronounced decline in birth rates happened in Ireland and Spain
during the 1980s where the number of live births per 1,000 people fell by be-
tween about one third and even one half, albeit from relatively high levels. A
similar observation holds for Italy and Portugal,yet over a larger time span al-
ready starting in the 1970s.A complete exception to this process,but arguably
quantitativelynegligible,isLuxembourgwherebirthratesdeclinedduringthe
1970s but recovered again in the 1980s and remained stable afterwards. Cer-
tainly,it is intellectually quite challenging to study the reasons for these devel-
opments.While this cannot be the topic of this paper,the heterogeneity in the
Gerontocracy in Motion? 5timing suggests that an explanation relying on changes in the technology of
birth control alone might not suffice.
During this period, these European countries also experienced a steady de-
cline in child and old-age mortality rates and, correspondingly, a continuous
rise in life expectancy.This progress fell much more uniformly on the various
countries. Together, the decline in birth rates and rising life expectancy have
generated a considerable shift in the population age structure throughout
Europe. Most notably, the population share of younger cohorts declined re-
markably. Figure 1 documents the changes in the population shares of under
20 year olds in the EU-15 countries for the most recent decade. It demon-
stratesthatthepopulationoftheyoungestcohortsinallEU-15countries–ex-
cept Luxembourg and the UK – decreased during the 1990s. Greece, Ireland,
Italy,Portugal and Spain experienced an especially pronounced decline rang-
ing from more than two percentage points in Greece to nearly 6 percentage
points in Ireland.
Most importantly,nothing in recent fertility trends suggests that we are likely
to see a recovery of the population shares of the young in the future. To the
contrary, these shares will remain low in the decades to come. This develop-
menttogetherwiththestillincreasinglifeexpectancyofoldercohortsleadsto
sharp increases in the predicted old-age dependency ratios for almost all
European countries (e.g.World Bank 1999).
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Live Births per 1,000 People in EU-15 Countries
1970–2000
Country 1970 1980 1990 2000
Austria 15.2 12.1 12.0 9.6
Belgium 14.7 12.7 11.7 11.2
Denmark 14.4 11.2 13.1 12.5
Finland 14.0 13.2 13.3 11.0
France 16.7 14.9 12.9 13.2
(West) Germany 13.4 10.1 10.0 9.4
Greece 16.5 15.4 10.0 11.7
Ireland 21.8 21.9 14.5 14.3
Italy 16.8 11.3 9.9 9.3
Luxembourg 13.2 11.3 13.2 13.1
The Netherlands 18.3 12.8 13.0 12.7
Portugal 20.0 16.3 11.4 11.8
Spain 19.6 18.0 9.9 9.8
Sweden 13.7 11.7 14.2 10.2
United Kingdom 16.3 13.4 13.7 11.4
Source:United Nations Demographic Yearbook,various volumes.
Table 1
RWI
ESSENWhile virtually all European countries share the experience of declining pop-
ulation fractions of the young,there is still considerable heterogeneity across
the EU-15 regarding the relative size of these fractions and thus the stage al-
ready reached in the ageing process. To illustrate this point, Figure 2 reports
thepopulationsharesofindividualsyoungerthan20yearsofageintheEU-15
countries for 1999.The relative size of this cohort varies by more than 10 per-
centage points across European countries with Italy (19.9 %) displaying the
lowest and Ireland (30.6 %) the highest share. The average share of under
20 year olds in the EU-countries is approximately 24 %.
Within the EU-15 countries,Ireland plays an exceptional role since this coun-
try still displayed a very large proportion of the young at the end of the last
century, despite the documented (Figure 1) sharp decline in this age group
during the 1990s. Another striking feature is the below-average population
fraction of the young throughout all Mediterranean countries. Since these
southern countries have been emigration regions for a long time and emi-
grants typically leave the country in younger years, to some extent this might
be the result of selective emigration.In essence,upon elimination of the Irish
andtheMediterraneanfiguresfromthegraph,cross-countryheterogeneityof
the population fraction of the very young would be limited.
In the modern era, the age structure of any population is shaped not only by
natural demographic processes, i.e. fertility and mortality, but also by migra-
tion.BycontrasttothecountriesofEurope’ssouthernborder,sincetheendof
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Source:United Nations Demographic Yearbook,various volumes.
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stantial net immigration. In recent years, this experience has been shared by
the Mediterranean countries as well.Overall,Europe as a whole underwent a
transition process from an emigration to an immigration region.In confirma-
tion of this assessment,Table 2 documents that many EU-countries currently
display a large stock of immigrants.A substantial fraction of this stock of im-
migrants comprises so-called second-generation migrants,i.e.the offspring of
immigrants born in the country of residence.
FromTable2itbecomestransparentthatforeign(-born)individualscomprise
a substantial share of the population and the labor force especially in Austria,
Belgium,France,Germany and,unsurprisingly,Luxembourg.However,these
figures do not reveal the important and often neglected effect of immigration
on birth rates and,therefore,population growth during the last decades.Since
migrants are typically young, in their prime child-bearing age and display
higher fertility rates than the native population, these immigration move-
ments have also had a rejuvenating impact on the population of the destina-
tion country. Schmidt (2000c), for instance, estimates that population growth
ratesinGermanywouldhavebeenaround0.5percentagepointslowerifthere
were no immigration during the 1960s and 1970s. In consequence, it is very
likely that higher immigration rates in the future can indeed (moderately)
contribute to an alleviation of the demographic burden.
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Source:United Nations Demographic Yearbook,various volumes.
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ESSENIn our description of the European ageing process,we have relied on the pop-
ulationfractionsoftheyoung,sincetheyareindicativeofbothtrendsandtim-
ing.In our empirical application we need a more comprehensive approach in
order to disentangle typical life cycle patterns from the consequences of gen-
erationalcrowding.Therefore,inadditiontoothercontrolvariables,weutilize
relative cohort sizes for five-year intervals as explanatory variables for the in-
dividuals’ labor market status. Figure 3 displays the distribution of these co-
hortsizesacrossallEU-15countries.Thesefiguresdocumenttheconsiderable
heterogeneity in relative cohort sizes across Europe,holding the promise that
our empirical analysis will be able to isolate the labor market consequences of
demographic changes.
Before we proceed to discuss the nexus of population ageing and (imperfectly
competitive) labor markets in detail, with a focus on (un-) employment, the
nextfewparagraphsprovideabriefoverviewonthecurrentlabormarketsitu-
ation in the EU-countries. It is certainly fair to argue that the connection be-
tween the particular stage of the ageing process characterizing each of these
countries,and their respective unemployment burden is not obvious.Thus,to
revealtheeffectofchangesintheagestructureathoroughmultivariateanaly-
sis is indispensable.
The labor market situation in almost all EU-countries is characterized by
rather high and persistent unemployment (e.g. Schmidt 2000a; 2000b for
Gerontocracy in Motion? 9
Foreign (Born) Population and Labor Force in EU-15 Countries
1996
Country







Austria 728 9.0 328 10.0
Belgium 912 9.0 341 8.1
Denmark 238 4.7 84 3.0
Finland 74 1.4 19 0.8
France 3,597 6.3 1605 6.3
Germany 7,314 8.9 2559 9.1
Ireland 118 3.2 52 3.5
Italy 1096 2.0 332 1.7
Luxembourg 143 34.1 118 53.8
The Netherlands 680 4.4 218 3.1
Portugal 173 1.7 87 1.8
Spain 539 1.3 162 1.0
Sweden 527 6.0 218 5.1
United Kingdom 1,972 3.4 878 3.4
Source:OECD 1998.Figures for France are for 1990.Figures for Greece not available.
Table 2
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ESSENFrance, Germany and the UK). Figure 4 depicts unemployment rates for the
economically most active group of 20–40 year olds as reported by the ILO1.In
many European countries these rates exceed 10 %, indicating a large excess
supply of labor. However, at the same time we also observe considerable ex-
cess demand for specific kinds of labor in some sectors and countries (e.g.
Zimmermannetal.2002forthecaseofGermany).Thisexcessdemandmainly
applies to higher qualification levels,though.Consequently,if we do not want
to miss out on a crucial labor market aspect, our discussion needs to address
the issue of qualification and skills as well.
A sizeable macroeconomic literature analyses the causes for the European
unemployment problem,attempting to isolate the roles played by institutions
and country-specific adverse shocks, and by the interactions between these
two. The most promising empirical attempts take an explicit cross-country
perspective, and relate outcomes to candidate explanatory factors such as
union power and corporatism, labor law, and the system of unemployment
support (an early seminal paper is Calmfors, Driffill 1988, another seminal
contributionisNickell1997).IntheiranalysisofEuropeancross-countrydata,
Blanchard/Wolfers (2000) augment the approach of Nickell (1997) by consid-
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1 Data from the ILO Laborsta Database (www.laborsta.ilo.org).ering interactions between shocks and institutions and conclude that the com-
bination of these two factors is decisive for a country’s poor labor market per-
formance. Generally, this literature suggests that the key to improvement
might lie in encompassing institutional reforms of the labor market,including
a dismantling of employment protection.
The dismal labor market situation motivated many European policy makers
to intensify their use of measures of active labor market policy (ALMP),with
the explicit aim to reduce unemployment. One important set of strategies
which also aims at reacting to the excess demand of skilled workers relies on
providingtheunemployedwithfurthervocationalqualifications.However,in-
ternational experiences with the effectiveness and efficiency of ALMP mea-
sures are rather disillusioning (Schmidt et al. 2001 for an international com-
parison of measures and results, and particularly Kluve, Schmidt 2002 for a
European perspective). Therefore, one should not put too much hope into
measures of ALMP as a solution of European labor market problems. These
two issues, encompassing labor market and institutional reforms, and discre-
tionary policy measures will play a prominent role in our discussion as well.
3. Population Ageing and Labor Markets
In terms of its economic repercussions,population ageing is first and foremost
equivalent to a decline of (i) the labor supply of younger relative to that of
older workers,and also to (ii) the number of workers relative to that of retir-
ees.Itseemssafetoarguethatthislatteraspecthasadirecteffectonthesocial





ees also holds direct and sizeable implications for aggregate labor productiv-
ity,depending on capital accumulation (Börsch-Supan 2003).
Yet,ageing also effects the composition of the active population,and thus ex-
erts important influences beyond the much-discussed hike of the pay-as-you-
go social security contribution rates. Thus, even if members of large birth co-
horts displayed the same life-cycle behavior regarding human capital acquisi-
tion and labor supply as members of small birth cohorts, would their preva-
lence tend to alter their economic prospects, and perhaps the aggregate out-
come.However,itismorethanlikelythatthisprocesswillalsodisplayindirect
effects via behavioral responses of individuals. To provide an overview, this
sectionaddressesthevariouslabormarketaspectsemanatingfromchangesin
the age structure of the population and the labor force.
14 Michael Fertig and Christoph M. SchmidtWe discuss the following labor market outcomes in their potential response to
population ageing (in parentheses: the central adjustment mechanism under
investigation):
– the structure of wages and the income distribution (relative scarcities),
– the level and structure of (un-) employment (imperfect competition),
– human and physical capital accumulation and labor supply (behavioral re-
sponses),and
– the organization of work and the structure of product demand (market ef-
fects).
Thesevariousdirectandindirecteffectsareintimatelyrelatedandmightexert
repercussions on demographic change itself, i.e. specifically on family forma-
tion and fertility.The remainder of this section outlines the state of the scien-
tific discussion – theoretically as well as empirically.
3.1 Structure of Wages and Income Distribution
To organize ideas, we first discuss the consequences of population and labor
forceageingforthebenchmarkcasewhereindividualstaketheirlife-cyclede-
cisions regarding human capital acquisition and labor supply irrespective of
the (relative) sizes of their own or other birth cohorts.Clearly,when relatively
few workers contribute to the economic activity of a large,mature population,
per-capita income will be relatively low, if higher capital accumulation does
not compensate for labor scarcity.Generally,since the number of active work-
ers is low the level of wages will tend to be high,though.Consequently,ageing
is a phenomenon driving a wedge between wages and per-capita income.The
income distribution is then determined by the capital ownership structure as
well.
Yet, population and labor force ageing are typically highly correlated. Thus,
ageing also affects the relative structure of labor market outcomes among
workers,not only the wages of workers relative to per-capita income.In more
formal terms, it might be instructive to view each birth cohort as a different
factor of production,as compared to the more homogeneous production fac-
tor capital2.As a birth cohort passes through the natural life-cycle,it is engag-
ing in human capital acquisition and labor market entry when young,concen-
tratingonhouseholdandlabormarketproductioninmediumage,andatsome
point it is exiting the labor market.Large birth cohorts will tend to experience
generational crowding throughout their lives, unless a high-fertility period or
the large-scale immigration of a subsequent birth cohort counteracts this pat-
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2 A sizeable literature discusses the heterogeneous productivity of different vintages of capital
items,but this is not of any relevance to our argument.tern.This is basically what we observe for the baby boom generation.In parti-
cular,in light of current population trends,it seems very unlikely that current
baby boomers will be followed by even larger birth cohorts in the absence of a
massive pro-immigration shift in policy.
At any point in time,age and birth cohort go hand in hand.Most prominently,
post-WWII baby boomers, now being in their late thirties or early fourties
constitutealargefractionofthepopulationinmanyEuropeancountries.Sim-
ilarly,therelativelysmallsubsequentbabybustgenerationisnowaroundtheir
late twenties.Due to the distinct and well-researched life-cycle patterns of la-
bor market activity and success, the focus of much of empirical labor econo-
mics has been on age-related heterogeneity of relevant outcomes. From this
perspective, variations in the size of birth cohorts, through their influence on
thefateofagenerationasitpassesdifferentages,tendtoalterage-relatedout-
come profiles in the cross-section.This is exactly the perspective taken in this
paper, following many important earlier contributions to the issue. Thus, for
the purposes of our analysis, we are identifying demographic change with
those alterations of the age structure associated with cohort size.
Consequently, we distinguish workers of different age as different factors of
production,and then focus on the relative prevalence of different age groups.
In the cross-section, age and birth cohort are related one-to-one. The funda-
mental identification condition that we maintain throughout, is that the one
andonlyimportantcharacteristicofanybirthcohortisitsrelativesize.Itseems
sensibletothinkofthesefactors–workersofdifferentages–asimperfectsub-
stitutes in production.Changes in relative cohort size of an age group directly
translate in shifts of relative labor supply of these different factors of produc-
tion. Large birth cohorts lead to relatively abundant labor supply when they
enter any age bracket, and to a corresponding reduction when they exit this
bracket again. For instance, currently the production factor medium-aged
workers is relatively abundant all across Europe, due to the widely-experi-
enced post-WWII baby boom.
In general, in a competitive setting all factors are fully employed. In equilib-
rium,more abundant factors command relatively low marginal productivities.
Thus,the relative shift in labor supply induced by an ageing population might
have an effect on the relative wages of younger and older workers and,there-
fore,on the income distribution of a society.All other things equal,as the pop-
ulationisageingtheproductionfactoryoungworkersbecomesscarcerandthe
relative wages of young workers should rise. The precise extent to which
wages of the young increase decisively rests upon the degree of substitutivity
between different age groups in the production process and the institutional
framework of the labor market. If, as we would presume, younger and older
workers are not perfect substitutes in production and labor markets were to
16 Michael Fertig and Christoph M. Schmidtwork without significant frictions (see below), the relative wages of younger
cohortswillrise.Sincelaborincomeistheprincipalincomesourceformostin-
dividuals and families, these altered age-earnings or age-wage profiles then
translate into a higher per-capita income in the young generation.
Asanempiricalpointofdeparture,thisfocusonrelativechangesoflaborsup-
ply across different age groups calls for an augmentation of standard wage re-
gressionswithmeasuresofcurrentcohortsizes.Alargebodyofliteratureana-
lyzing the US baby boom cohorts (e.g. Connelly 1986; Freeman 1979; Welch
1979) already documents a corresponding response of wages to a relative shift
in labor supply, with larger cohorts experiencing lower wages. The empirical
evidence for European countries is rather slim, though, and no clear picture
emerges. Wright (1991) provides evidence for the case of UK that larger co-
horts have lower earnings, when they are young but that this effect does not
persist as the cohort ages. Klevmarken (1993) reports no significant cohort
size effects for Swedish data. However, Dahlberg/Nahum (2003), utilizing al-
ternativedataforthecaseofSweden,findsignificanteffectsofcohortsizeson
earnings.According to their results,these estimated effects vary across educa-
tion levels.
For Germany,despite the rather strong decline in birth rates in the 1970s and
the corresponding decline in relative cohort sizes of the young,no obvious ef-
fect on the relative income position of younger cohorts emerges (Figure 5).
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Relative Income of Full-Time Working 18-21 Year Olds in Germany 1
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ESSENRather, the relative income of young workers fluctuates considerably in a
fashion that seems to be related to a variety of factors. In addition to cohort
size, changes in the intensity and duration of education and correspondingly,
labor supply seem to be prime candidates for a deeper analysis.Moreover,ag-
gregate economic developments may confound the picture even further. Yet,
in a corporatist country such as Germany,we would hardly expect the relative
wagesofemployedworkerstoreflectthesealteredfactorsdirectly.Rather,the
wage setting process will amalgamate relative factor scarcities,the bargaining
power of different generations, and the desire to rely on a stable wage struc-
ture. These aspects and their implications for wage structure rigidity will be
addressed below.
3.2 Level and Structure of (Un-) Employment
In a corporatist economy the wages of different workers and, thus, the entire
wage structure are bound to reflect factor scarcities at least partially in the
long run.Skills,for instance,are the staple of any modern production process,
and the wage premium for skills – the return to education – has been rising in
the last decades in step with the growing importance of formal education.Yet,
by contrast to a perfectly competitive labor market,in a labor market charac-
terized by strong employer associations and unions,relative wages are not ad-
justed quickly to altered scarcities, perhaps not even completely in the long
run. Rather wages tend to be rigid, and the wage structure is likely to reflect
non-economicfactors,suchasthebargainingpowerofdifferentfactionsinthe
bargaining associations.
Unions led by a gerontocracy of functionaries,for instance,might not be in fa-
vor of a change in the relative wage structure to the disadvantage of older
workers,even though due to demographic fluctuations mature workers might
be extraordinarily abundant – and,thus,less productive – and young workers
unusually scarce – and, thus, more productive than before. Such a policy is
moresustainableintimesofstrongeconomicgrowth,whenemploymentrates
arehigh,suchasinthe“goldenera”(Crafts,Toniolo1996)ofeconomicgrowth
during the early post-WWII decades.Stable demographics do also help,since
youngworkerscanrelyongrowingintothestrongerbargainingpositioneven-
tually themselves.
In times of lacking economic growth,or in an era of demographic change,sus-
taining such a stable-wage-structure policy will be more difficult, though. In
particular,groupsofworkerswhosewages–withrespecttotheirrelativescar-
city – are set relatively high,in our example older workers,tend to experience
high unemployment rates and, once unemployed, low transition rates out of
unemployment. Incidentally, this description appears to fit many continental
European labor markets at the turn of the new century. In such an environ-
18 Michael Fertig and Christoph M. Schmidtment,keeping the age profile of wages stable despite high old-age unemploy-
ment is the more sustainable, the more generous is the system of unemploy-
ment support. Is wage rigidity indeed favoring older workers, additional sup-
portfortheseotherwiseunsustainablyhighwagesmightbecreatedartificially
by the state,in the form of early retirement programs,or by seniority rules re-
garding layoffs.
That is, the availability of programs designed to alleviate the unemployment
burden of workers being close to retirement – or, more precisely, the confi-
dence that a high unemployment rate of these workers will suffice to muster
enough political support for their creation – can be central to a bargaining
strategy that rewards their work disproportionately highly. Under such cir-
cumstances, employers and their associations will support this policy as well,
since early retirement programs can be used as an inexpensive work force
management tool. Moreover, bargaining every year over the percentage ad-
justment of the stable wage structure is much less complicated and costly than
calling its shape – i.e.the relative wages of young and old workers – into ques-
tion as well. The taxpayer, not the bargaining parties will pick up the bill for
maintaining a rigid seniority-wages relationship.
A stripped-down theoretical model embodying many of these ideas has been
developed in Schmidt (1993). In this setup, a monopoly union represents dif-
ferent age groups of workers whose relative prevalences vary over time. For
simplicity,thinkoflaborsupplyateachagebracketasbeinginelastic,andcon-
sider workers of different ages as imperfect substitutes in production,with the
structureofrelativelabordemandbeingstableovertime.Thisimplies,specifi-
cally that the only other production factor,capital,is not reflecting the type of
workers it is producing with.Rather,the only changes we concentrate on here
are the fluctuations of relative labor supplies.
If the monopoly union maximizes the wage bill, the wage of each age group
does not reflect its relative scarcity.What fluctuates over time,though,are the
(relative) (un-) employment rates of the different age groups of workers. As
this stylized model suggests, with unionized wage bargaining, (un-) employ-
ment rates might be affected more strongly by the relative shifts in labor sup-
ply associated with population ageing than wages.If the relative shift of labor
supply does not translate (fully) into rising relative wages of younger workers,
their relative employment rates might rise and their relative unemployment
rates decrease while that of older workers might improve.
However,by contrast to the stylized model in Schmidt (1993),labor supply is
presumably not inelastic for all groups of workers. While this presumption
mightapproximatethelabormarketbehaviorofcore-ageworkersquiteaccu-
rately, in times of high unemployment young workers can easily extend their
investment into education and older workers can exit the labor market into
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labor supply behavior than men in all advanced economies, evidenced by a
large literature on the labor supply of married women (form a seminal source
seeKillingsworth,Heckman1986).Intimesofhighunemploymenthomepro-
duction is becoming relatively attractive,and reduced labor market participa-
tion might be the safety valve to mitigate the consequences of generational
crowding.
These arguments call for a concentration of the empirical analysis on employ-
ment rates instead of unemployment rates. This is exactly the route followed
by our own empirical study discussed in the next section. It seems clear,
though, that several confounding developments, most importantly the rising
secular trend towards higher labor force participation associated with the
higher education and lower fertility of more recent generations of women will
needtobedisentangledempiricallyfromtheeffectsofgenerationalcrowding.
These complications call for pursing a cross-country perspective,and for bas-
ing the analysis on micro data, since this permits taking educational attain-
ment into account.
In essence, if rigidities prevent the wage structure from adjusting completely
tovariationsinrelativefactorscarcities,theconsequenceswillariseintermsof
employment and unemployment. Previous literature placed its attention on
age-specific unemployment rates. The empirical evidence on the relationship
between cohort sizes and unemployment is very mixed. Korenman/Neumark
(2000) examine the effect of changes in the population age structure on youth
employment and unemployment rates utilizing time-series data for 11 Euro-
peancountriesaswellasAustralia,Canada,JapanandtheUSforaperiodcov-
ering 1970–1994. Their results suggest that large youth cohorts lead to in-
creases in the youth unemployment rate,but,if,any modest effects on the em-
ployment rates of youths. The authors also report weak evidence that labor
market institutions that decrease flexibility lead to more pronounced re-
sponses of youth (un-) employment rates to changes in the population age
structure.
Shimer (2001) uses data from all states in the US for the period from 1978 to
1996 to investigate the reaction of the (youth) unemployment and labor mar-
ketparticipationratetochangesinthepopulationagestructure.Theresultsof
his instrumental variable approach suggest a rather large negative effect of an
increase in the relative size of younger cohorts on the unemployment rate of
younger and older workers,i.e.the larger the relative size of younger cohorts
the lower are the unemployment rates of both age groups. Furthermore, the
authorreportsanincreaseinlabormarketparticipationratesforyoungerand,
although less pronounced,for older workers in response to an increase of the
relative size of younger cohorts.
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Western Germany on the incidence of unemployment in different sex-age
groups (also Zimmermann 1991). The German wage setting process appears
to be characterized by the presence of a strong union movement that hampers
flexible wage adjustments. Thus, age structure variations can be expected to
lead to fluctuations in age-specific unemployment rates. In general, this intu-
itionisconfirmedbytheestimatespresentedbytheauthor.However,astrong
positive relationship between the size of a cohort and its relative unemploy-
ment experience can only be established formally for a few sex-age groups.
The stylized model of a monopoly union maximizing the wage bill is only a
point of departure for a deeper analysis of the bargaining process, though.
Consequently,the question of how alterations of the population age structure
influence the bargaining process and its outcomes is more intricate. Spe-
cifically,it might well be that larger cohorts can exert an influence which miti-
gates the adverse effects of generational crowding.A theoretical model which
embodies such a political economy consideration is left to further research.
Yet it is already clear that any empirical analysis should take account of the
possibility that in a corporatist wage setting cohort size might influence em-
ployment rates and economic prosperity negatively as well as positively.
3.3 Human and Physical Capital Accumulation and Labor Supply
Alterations of the age-earnings profile and on the income distribution across
generations might have indirect effects through behavioral responses as well.
Forinstance,suchashiftintheincomedistributioninfavorofyoungercohorts
might even provide an additional incentive for earlier retirement of older and
for a larger labor market participation of younger workers. Furthermore, in-
creased labor market participation of the young together with the improve-
mentoftheirincomepositioncouldthenimpingeuponreproductivebehavior
of these young people and induce a further decline in birth rates.The link be-
tween economic prosperity and fertility lies at the heart of population eco-
nomics, but both theoretically and empirically this issue is far from resolved.
Hereweconcentrateoneducationalattainmentoftheshrinkingyounggener-
ations and the accumulation of physical capital, leaving fertility decisions to
further research.
The shift in the structure of the economically active population towards a
higher share of older workers might impinge upon the level and structure of
savingsaswellasthereturnstostocksandbonds.Someobserversattributethe
substantial rise in US asset prices during the 1990s to the increased asset de-
mandbybabyboomcohortsenteringtheirprimeearningyears.Consequently,
asset prices are predicted to decline as soon as this population group reaches
retirementageandbeginstoreduceitsassetholdings.Theoreticalmodels(e.g.
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strong assumptions have to hold for this conclusion to be reliable.However,if
such a relationship between the age structure of the population and asset re-
turns exists,this might have an impact on the rate of return of investment and,
therefore, via capital accumulation on growth, wages, and (un-) employment
rates.
The existing empirical evidence on the relationship between the population
age structure and asset prices is rather mixed.Poterba (2001) analyzes the as-
sociationbetweentheagestructureofthepopulationandthereturnstostocks
and bonds in the US. Using age-wealth profiles from repeated cross-sections
of the Survey of Consumer Finances for the period 1983–1995, he demon-
strates that wealth rises sharply when households are in their thirties and for-
ties but the decline is much less pronounced as soon as they enter retirement.
Furthermore,thispaperalsoanalyzestimeseriesdataonthepopulationstruc-
ture and real returns on different financial assets for Canada,the UK and the
US. It does not find any robust evidence on the response of asset returns to
changes in the population age structure. Therefore, one should be hesitant to
predict large changes in asset values due to demographic change.
Hence,itisratherunlikelythattherelativedeclineinlaborsupplyduetopop-
ulationageingwillbecompensatedbyahighercapitalintensityintheproduc-
tion process (Börsch-Supan 2003). Thus the growth in per-capita income will
suffer, even though domestic capital may flow increasingly to more labor-
abundantinvestmentopportunitiesabroad.Therefore,tokeepgrowthratesof
aggregate output at their current levels,a higher human capital accumulation
of younger cohorts is indispensable. Population ageing might act as an addi-
tional incentive for younger cohorts to invest in human capital,if the relative
shift in labor supply results in a rise of young workers’ wages,since for this age
groupthereturnstoeducationwillincrease.Allotherthingsequal,thisshould
lead to higher human capital accumulation by the young. However, it is also
conceivable that a shrinking labor force which reduces labor market competi-
tionmightcounterbalancethiseffect,sothatthenetimpactofpopulationage-
ing on the human capital acquisition of younger cohorts is ambiguous. Em-
pirically, this phenomenon is quite well researched for the US (e.g. Connelly
1986; Connelly, Gottschalk 1995; Stapleton, Young 1988). These studies dem-
onstrate that due to the decline in the private returns to education in response
to larger relative cohort sizes, the human capital accumulation of relatively
large cohorts decreases.
Fertig(2003)analyzesthisrelationshipforthecaseofGermany.Utilizingdata
for birth cohorts entering the German labor market during the 1980s and
1990s the author demonstrates that relative own cohort sizes display a nega-
tive impact on different indicators (highest schooling and highest professional
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thermore,the structure of the cohorts with respect to the average educational
attainment of the parent generation impinges upon these indicators as well.
However,there is also considerable heterogeneity in these effects for cohorts
before and after the sharp drop in birth rates at the beginning of the 1970s.
Therefore, this paper documents the intricate relationship between demo-
graphic change and human capital accumulation.
3.4 Organization of Work and Structure of Product Demand
Duringtheageingprocessacrossthelifecycleindividualphysicalabilitymight
decline and human capital investments made in the past will gradually depre-
ciate. Numerous empirical studies in the received literature document that
there exists a robust and inversely u-shaped relationship between an individ-
ual’sageandearningsand,thus,presumablyproductivity(seealsoourempiri-
calapplicationbelow).Thus,populationageingmightalsohaveanegativeim-
pact on aggregate productivity,since the productivity of older,more prevalent
cohortsisvaning.Thisisexactlytheideaofpresumingstablelife-cycleprofiles
of labor income.
We have seen above that life-cycle profiles might be twisted by relative scarci-
tieswhentheagecompositionofthelaborforcechanges.Wehavealsoargued
that young generations can emphasize these changes by high investments into
human capital.If the productivity decline of older workers cannot be offset by
higher human capital accumulation of the young, then the ageing process
might have a negative impact on an economy’s output level, its growth rates
and employment levels. Börsch-Supan (2003) argues that this effect will be
quantitatively less important for per-capita incomes than the massive rise of
the old-age dependency ratio,though.
However,there might be alterations of these profiles which reflect more than
the usual relative scarcity calculus. The negative impact of a large cohort size
might be (partially) offset by the way higher labor market experience is re-
warded as technological progress unfolds. Specifically, there might be fac-
tor-inducedtechnicalchange(Acemoglu2002)inthesensethattheproductiv-
ity of experienced workers, then the more abundant factor, rises dispropor-
tionately. Consequently, the net effect of ageing on individual productivity is
a priori not clear. An interesting, but up to now in the scientific literature
mostlyignoredissueistheextenttowhichfirmsareabletocopewiththisphe-
nomenon by adequate measures of organizational change, inducing dispro-
portionate increases of the productivity of more prevalent generations.
Finally,there might be an additional effect of population ageing on labor mar-
kets via changes in the level and structure of product demand due to a higher
share of elderly in the population (Börsch-Supan 2003).If during the process
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structureofemploymentacrossdifferentsectorsoftheeconomyisaffectedby
thisphenomenonaswell.Thisiscertainlyanevenmorepredominantfactorin
rather closed economies.However,due to the similarities in the demographic
change in almost all industrialized economies one would expect that open
economies will be affected by changes in product demand as well.




The next section,therefore,presents some empirical evidence on the relation-
ship between population ageing and the probability of being employed – i.e.
for employment rates – for individuals living in EU-countries.
4. Cohort Size and Unemployment – European Cross-Country Evidence
In our empirical application, we utilize the 1999 wave of the European Com-
munity Household Panel (ECHP) for all EU-15 countries except Luxem-
bourg3. We restrict the analysis to the economically active population, i.e. all
15–64 old individuals not being in school any longer. The dependent variable
in our analysis is the individual employment status,taking the value of 1 if the
individual is regularly employed (works 15 hours or more per week) and zero
otherwise. We analyze this variable in a discrete choice framework (Probit
model).In this endeavor,we jointly employ three different sets of explanatory
variables: (i) individual characteristics, (ii) variables measuring the demo-
graphic change,and (iii) a full set of country indicators.Table 4 in the Appen-
dix provides a brief description of all variables and Table 5 reports some de-
scriptive statistics.
The first set of explanatory variables,i.e.individual characteristics,comprises
the individual’s gender,his/her level of educational attainment,and a variable
indicating whether or not an individual has any chronic physical or mental
health problem,illness or disability.This first subset of variables also includes
the individual’s age (in years).In our Probit regressions,we allow age and age
squared to exert different effects for three different age groups. The first age
group comprises young adults aged 15–29 years, the second group comprises
the“primeearningyears”30–55,andthethirdagegroupcontainsallindividu-
als older than 55 (i.e. 55–64). For each of these employment-age profiles we
would expect to find a concave,i.e.inversely u-shaped,relationship.This pat-
tern is bound to reflect a large number of influences,among them the initially
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3 Luxembourg had to be dropped due to missing observations for one of our explanatory varia-
bles.increasing and later declining individual productivity over the life cycle, as
well as education, family formation, and retirement decisions. Overall, these
variables are supposed to control for individual characteristics impinging
upon individual employment chances in a pragmatic fashion.
The second subset of exploratory factors is measuring demographic change.
This set contains the relative own cohort size and its square, measured as the
shareofindividualsineachfive-yearage-brackets(i.e.15-19,20–24,…,60–64)
relative to the total population. These two variables are intended to capture
theindependenteffectofbelongingtoalargeorsmallcohort,giveneachindi-
vidual’s age.If wages do not (fully) respond to changes in cohort size,we will
expectanegativerelationshipbetweentheindividualprobabilityofbeingem-
ployed and the size of one’s own cohort. If, on the other hand, political econ-
omy effects come into play,these relations might be more intricate.
Furthermore, this set of variables comprises the education structure of each
individual’s own cohort,measured as the share of highly educated individuals
ineachcohort.Withthisvariableweintendtocapturetheeffectonindividuals
ofresponsesinageneration’saveragehumancapitalaccumulationtochanges
in its relative cohort size. Specifically, we expect human capital accumulation
to counteract generational crowding. If the secular trend towards increasing
education confounds the negative effects of cohort size, in particular for the
babyboomersandthesubsequentsmallerbirthcohorts,theseparateinclusion
of the educational stance of each cohort will allow the separate identification
of cohort size effects.
Finally,our explanatory variables comprise a full set of country indicators act-
ing as country fixed effects in our estimations. These country indicators are
supposed to control for unobservable country-specific peculiarities which,on
average, equally impinge upon the employment probability of all individuals
livinginthiscountry.Amongthesecountry-specificaspects,onemightthinkof
wage bargaining systems or behavioral differences in labor market participa-
tion. Since these variables are merely country-specific constants, their inter-
pretationisdifficultandwewillabstainfromplacinganystructuralinterpreta-
tion on their estimates. The only purpose of these variables is to prevent the
estimates for all other variables from being contaminated by such coun-
try-specific idiosyncrasies.
Table 3 reports the results of our Probit model for the full sample of 98,568 in-
dividuals and the results for a restricted sample of 48,172 men.This restricted
analysis explicitly takes the differences in the labor market participation be-
havior between men and women into account.By isolating questions of parti-
cipation from the impact of demographic change on individual employment
probabilities, the restricted analysis portrays the effects of generational
crowding for those workers with low labor supply elasticities.
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sociated t-values.The marginal effects can be interpreted straightforwardly as
thepercentage-pointchangeintheprobabilitytoberegularlyemployedinre-
sponse to a unit-change in the respective explanatory variable, holding all
other explanatory variables, including indicator variables, at their mean val-
ues4.Theassociatedt-valuesprovideanassessmentofthestatisticalreliability
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Probability to be Employed
Probit Estimation Results – Dependent Variable:Employed (yes/no)
Variable
Complete sample Restricted sample-Men
marginal effect t-value marginal effect t-value
Individual characteristics
Age (at 24)1 0.1175 39.29 0.1391 30.99
Age (at 40)1 0.0105 9.63 0.0122 6.99
Age (at 60)1 –0.1468 –30.85 –0.1605 –24.41
Female –0.2690 –80.80 – –
Medium education –0.1294 –24.04 –0.0702 –10.47
Low Education –0.1782 –35.45 –0.0509 –8.14
Disability –0.1721 –38.21 –0.2287 –39.19
Variables measuring demographic change
Relative own cohort size
(at sample mean,%)1 0.0410 5.80 0.0382 3.55
Share of highly educated
in own cohort (%) 0.0022 8.16 0.1925 6.08
Country indicators (base category is UK)
Germany 0.0923 6.77 0.0739 4.79
Denmark 0.1678 12.42 0.0946 6.06
The Netherlands 0.0919 5.71 0.0885 5.07
Belgium –0.0207 –1.59 –0.0198 –1.22
France 0.0071 0.55 –0.0244 –1.57
Ireland 0.0543 3.62 0.0818 5.05
Italy –0.0436 –2.58 –0.0214 –1.07
Greece 0.0022 0.14 0.0689 4.08
Spain –0.0730 –5.26 –0.0090 –0.55
Portugal 0.1639 10.86 0.1215 7.45
Austria 0.1187 7.18 0.1033 5.89
Finland 0.0960 7.91 0.0408 2.81
Sweden 0.1415 11.49 0.0714 4.98
Diagnostics:
Pseudo R-squared 0.21 0.26
Number of observations 98,568 48,172






year, respectively. For indicator variables, the corresponding unit-change is the hypothetical
switch from zero to one.oftheestimatedmarginaleffects,witht-valuesgreaterthan1.96indicatingsta-
tistically significant estimates at a 95 % confidence level.
Before we address the issue of generational crowding, we briefly discuss our
results regarding the included covariates.Throughout the EU women display
considerably lower employment rates, with a point estimate of nearly 27 per-
centagepoints.Clearly,highlyeducatedindividualsaremuchmorelikelytobe
employed than individuals with medium or even low education. These dis-
crepancies are less pronounced for men, providing an indication for the rele-
vance of participation issues for the labor market behavior of women. Simi-
larly,disabled men experience disproportionately low employment rates.This
pattern is quite consistent with a voluntary withdrawal of women from the la-
bor force in case of health problems.
Regarding the life-cycle profile of employment rates, our estimates indicate
thataninitialphaseofincreasingemploymentpropensities–individualsfinal-
izing their human capital investments and entering the labor market – is typi-
callyfollowedbyaplateauphaseoflaborforceparticipationandemployment
during core-age years and then by a pronounced decline in employment prob-
abilities for the oldest age-group (55–64 years). This estimated life-cycle pat-
tern is depicted graphically in Figure 6.
Our emphasis is on the variables measuring demographic change,reported in
Table 3. Regarding the independent effect of cohort size, our estimation re-
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Age-Employment Probability Profile in EU-15 Countries
Deviation of mean employment probability in %-points












Authors’ calculations from ECHP.
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ESSENsultsdifferconsiderablyfordifferentcohortsizes.Whilethemarginaleffectof
increasing cohort size on employment propensities is strongly negative when
cohort size is small,it increases with growing cohort size.At the mean cohort
size (around 7 %), the employment probability is rising by 0.04 percentage
points for each 1 percentage point increase in cohort size (for the complete
sample).Overall,the estimates suggest an u-shaped relationship between the
individual employment probability and the size of one’s own cohort.
Within our sample relative cohort sizes vary between 3.9 % and 8.8 %.
Figure7depictstherelationshipbetweencohortsizesandemploymentproba-
bilityforcohortsizesfrom3.5%to9%.Thisfigureindicatesthatforsmallco-
horts the employment probability is falling with increasing cohort size but for
cohorts larger than approximately6%o ft h etotal population it increases
again. This, at first glance, rather striking result indicates that larger cohorts
are able to exert enough influence or otherwise unfold activities to mitigate
the negative labor market consequences of generational crowding. The pre-
cise nature of these processes will certainly present an interesting area for fur-
ther research.
If we had not controlled for the education structure of the cohort of each sur-
vey, respondent, our results regarding the effect of cohort size would have
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ESSENbeen –0.06 (marginal effect for complete sample5). Indeed, the educational
structure of one’s own cohort has a significant and positive impact on employ-
ment probabilities.A 1 % increase in the share of highly educated individuals
in one’s own cohort increases the individual probability to be regularly em-
ployed by slightly more than 0.002 percentage points, all other things equal.
Thispositiveeffectindicatesthatachangeinthepopulationagestructurepro-
vides a motive for further human capital accumulation. This behavioral re-
sponse then impinges upon individual employment probabilities.
5. Policy Options
Changes in the population age structure have the potential to affect the eco-
nomicprosperityofindividualsconsiderably.Measuredoverthecompletelife
cycle, members of large cohorts apparently tend to experience lower wages
and incomes,and lower employment rates than small cohorts under otherwise
identical circumstances. The available evidence suggests that small cohorts
even tend to invest relatively intensively into human capital,and that the pro-
ductivity of small cohorts might be lifted further by disproportionate comple-
mentary accumulation of physical capital. Viewed from this perspective, the
seculartrendtoasignificantlyolder,andshrinkingsocietyseemstoentailseri-
ous advantages for subsequent generations.
Yet,this prediction is far from conveying the complete picture.A first reason
ofuncertaintyliesinthenatureandextentoftechnologicalprogress.Through-
out the modern era, subsequent generations have tended to experience con-
siderably higher economic prosperity during their life times than their prede-
cessors, as a consequence of the fast and steady accumulation of human
knowledge.Whilethistendencyhassloweddowninrecentdecades,inlifetime
perspective its effects benefit the baby boom generation of the 1960s in com-
parison to the smaller post-WWII generation. The nature of technological
progress does not need to be neutral, though (Acemoglu 2002). It is conceiv-
able that many technological and organizational advances throughout the
next decades might enhance the productivity of the large baby boom genera-
tion disproportionately,which is by then a generation of older workers.
Thus, the market itself might mitigate the disadvantages of generational
crowding. A related phenomenon concerns questions of political economy.
Particularly in the corporatist economies of continental Europe,we might ex-
pect large cohorts to experience relatively favorable outcomes,since they can
influencetheworkingofthemarkettotheiradvantage.Ourownempiricalap-
plication provided evidence on employment rates which are consistent with
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5 Full results for the specification without cohort structure are available from the authors upon
request.this argument. In consequence, whether subsequent, smaller cohorts will in-
deedexperiencerelativeeconomicprosperitybecauseoftheirscarcity,isquite
uncertain.
The real problem for the smaller generations of the future are the
intergenerational linkages that characterize every society. From the vantage
point of aggregate welfare, it is the income per capita, not the income per
worker which is of central interest. Indeed, current generations of workers
have a vital interest in a high productivity of subsequent smaller generations –
otherwise it will be difficult to sustain prosperity growth for the population as
a whole, children, workers, and retirees alike. Needless to say, the informal,
intra-familyandinstitutionalized,anonymousformsofredistributinglaborin-
come lie at the heart of the issue. A high level of income taxes, for instance,
mightensurethatthedisproportionatelyhighincomeofyoungworkersispar-
tially translated into infrastructure and health services benefiting retirees.
The most direct way of intergenerational redistribution is the system provid-
ing old-age income security.In most European economies,it currently rests to
a large extent on a pay-as-you-go idea, re-distributing income perpetually
from the currently active generation to retirees, maintaining this principle
from generation to generation. These systems’ central parameter in times of
rapid demographic change is certainly the replacement rate. A high replace-
ment rate ties the income of retirees generously to the income of workers,ne-
cessitating this generation to contribute a larger chunk of their product to the
system when its population share is small. This is exactly the root of the cur-
rent political debate surrounding the pension system.
Yet, it has become clear in our discussion that the structure of labor market
outcomes is affected in a similar fashion by institutional arrangements. A
prime example is an age-earnings profile which historically is held stable
intertemporally by the employer associations and unions in their overall wage
bargain. More generally, a problem will typically arise whenever institutions
are put into place with the current age structure in mind. When these institu-
tionsfacedifferentdemographiccircumstances,theyareindangeroffailingor
– with the same outcome – lose their consensus support. This principle holds
for systems of old-age security and labor market institutions alike.
Twotypesof–mutuallynon-exclusive–remediescanbeemployedtowardoff
the demographic challenge. One avenue might be to tackle the demographic
changedirectly.Acontentiousandprobablynotextremelypromisingstrategy
is the implementation of programs intending to foster fertility. They are usu-
ally not too promising,because the incentives serious enough to alter this key
decision in the lives of most adults would have to be quite generous.They are
contentious,since they address the voluntary decisions of people,after all.At
best, the desired alleviation of the demographic problems of social security
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over time.
A similar strategy would be to take both the demographic change and current
systems of old-age incomes security as given, but to ensure that labor force
participations rates increase at the beginning and at the end of the workers’
career. That is, spells of education should become shorter, perhaps by intro-
ducing education fees, raising cost awareness in publicly provided education
systems.Also,earlyretirementprogramsshouldbeabolished.Tothecontrary,
the mandatory retirement age should be adjusted upward to reflect the rising
life expectancies of more recent generations.Similarly,one could aim at an in-
creasing labor market participation of married women, by providing better
and more widely available child care facilities,or by programs designed to fa-
cilitate a smoother return to the labor market after a phase of home produc-
tion.
Finally,onemightoptformoreimmigrationtoaltertheageandskillstructure
of the population. It has been demonstrated conclusively (e.g. Börsch-Supan
2002) that immigration provides a route for relieving the demographic pres-
sure currently inflicting old-age security systems of the pay-as-you-go mold,
but also that this does not provide a solution in the long run.Young adult im-
migrants quickly grow themselves from being a rejuvenating factor to being
maturemembersofthepopulation.Thisleavestheirmaindemographicimpe-
tustobetheirenhancingeffectsonfuturefertility(Schmidt2000c).Moreover,
new contributors to the system today generate more obligations for the sys-
tems tomorrow, implying the need for a constant influx of young adult immi-
grants to make this alleviation strategy work.Thus,ultimately a reform of the
systems of social security cannot be avoided.
Thesecondavenueforpolicywouldbetoacceptthedemographicchange,and
to engage in reforms of those institutions which are under demographic pres-
sure.Regardingthesystemofold-agesecurityandotheraspectsofsocialsecu-




system.Regarding the functioning of the labor market,it would be important
to ensure that wages do increasingly reflect relative scarcities,before the large
generation of baby boomers enters the final decade of their working career.
This move might well imply breaking a gerontocratic minimum wage cartel.
In any case, labor markets working more smoothly will be an important pre-
requisiteforsatisfactoryaggregategrowth.Anotherkeyaspectforcopingsuc-
cessfully with an ageing population is certainly the provision of incentives for
higher human capital accumulation.This also applies to older workers,which
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important for younger cohorts whose productivity necessarily carries overall
economic growth.During the next decades,much will depend on the way that
thelargebaby-boomgenerationmanagestokeepabreastoftechnologicaland
organizational change.What will be needed in terms of social institutions are
unionsandlaborcourtsembracingtheideaoflife-longlearningandindividual
accountability,instead of defending mechanical seniority rules in wage setting
and in hiring and layoff procedures.
While at the outset it is clear that these two major policy options might com-
plement one another, it is far from obvious which of their elements are most
promising. Indeed, many of the potential cures, specifically those accommo-
dating current institutions to the changing age structure,might have repercus-
sions on birth rates and might therefore counteract the original policy mea-
sure. Even measures aiming at increasing labor market flexibility, including
decentralizedwagebargainingprocedurestomakewagesrespondingtoshifts
in labor supply, might entail potential repercussions on birth rates via in-
creased income.Similarly,the provision of incentives for higher labor market
participation of women might exert feedback effects on birth rates. Finally, it
has been a clear,albeit disenchanting message from the literature on active la-
bormarketpoliciesthatthepotentialofqualificationmeasuresofactivelabor
market policy is limited. Thus, since the effectiveness and efficiency of these
policyoptionsisfarfrombeingguaranteed,thereisanurgentneedforevalua-
tion studies accompanying any introduction of such measures.
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Employed 1 if individual is regularly employed (15+ hours per week);
0 otherwise
Individual characteristics
Age in age group below 30 Age of individual in years,if the individual is younger than 30
Age squared in age group below 30 Squared age of individual,if the individual is younger than 30
Age in age group 30–55 Age of individual in years,if the individual is 30-55 years of age
Age squared in age group 30–55 Squared age of individual,if the individual is 30-55 years of age
Age in age group above 55 Age of individual in years,if the individual is older than 55
Age squared in age group above 55 Squared age of individual,if the individual is older than 55
Female 1 if individual is female;0 otherwise
Medium education 1 if individual has a medium education degree,i.e.second stage of
secondary education (ISCED 3);0 otherwise
Low Education 1 if individual has a low education degree,i.e.less than second stage
of secondary education (ISCED 0-2);0 otherwise
Disability 1 if individual is has any chronic physical or mental health problem,
illness or disability.;0 otherwise
Variables measuring demographic change
Relative own cohort size Relative size of individual's cohort in per cent
Relative own cohort size squared Squared relative size of individual's cohort
Share of highly educated in cohort Share of highly educated individuals in own cohort in per cent
Country indicators
UK 1 if individual lives in the United Kingdom;0 otherwise
Germany 1 if individual lives in Germany;0 otherwise
Denmark 1 if individual lives in Denmark;0 otherwise
The Netherlands 1 if individual lives in The Netherlands;0 otherwise
Belgium 1 if individual lives in Belgium;0 otherwise
France 1 if individual lives in France;0 otherwise
Ireland 1 if individual lives in Ireland;0 otherwise
Italy 1 if individual lives in Italy;0 otherwise
Greece 1 if individual lives in Greece;0 otherwise
Spain 1 if individual lives in Spain;0 otherwise
Portugal 1 if individual lives in Portugal;0 otherwise
Austria 1 if individual lives in Austria;0 otherwise
Finland 1 if individual lives in Finland;0 otherwise
Sweden 1 if individual lives in Sweden;0 otherwise
Table 4
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Summary Statistics of Variables
Variable








Employed 0.629 0.483 0.744 0.436
Individual characteristics
Age in age group below 30 6.580 10.623 6.645 10.652
Age squared in age group below 30 156.147 264.464 157.611 265.186
Age in age group 30–55 23.950 21.571 23.870 21.558
Age squared in age group 30–55 1038.878 1020.957 1034.535 1019.714
Age in age group above 55 8.749 21.188 8.644 21.076
Age squared in age group above 55 525.451 1276.645 518.931 1269.245
Female 0.511 0.500 – –
Medium education 0.318 0.466 0.320 0.467
Low Education 0.474 0.499 0.472 0.499
Disability 0.199 0.399 0.190 0.392
Variables measuring demographic change
Relative own cohort size 6.878 1.027 6.886 1.027
Relative own cohort size squared 48.359 13.852 48.477 13.875
Share of highly educated in cohort 20.97 16.70 20.86 16.51
Country indicators
UK 0.072 0.258 0.068 0.252
Germany 0.098 0.297 0.098 0.298
Denmark 0.034 0.181 0.034 0.181
The Netherlands 0.075 0.264 0.073 0.260
Belgium 0.040 0.196 0.039 0.193
France 0.085 0.279 0.085 0.279
Ireland 0.045 0.207 0.046 0.210
Italy 0.128 0.335 0.130 0.337
Greece 0.072 0.258 0.071 0.257
Spain 0.104 0.305 0.105 0.306
Portugal 0.087 0.282 0.087 0.282
Austria 0.050 0.219 0.051 0.220
Finland 0.063 0.242 0.064 0.244
Sweden 0.047 0.212 0.048 0.215
Number of observations 98,568 48,172
Table 5
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